THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE LOCAL SPHERE OF GOVERNMENT TO CONSERVE AND PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF LE SUEUR v eTHEKWINI MUNICIPALITY [2013] ZAKZPHC 6 (30 January 2013) by Warren Freedman
 
 
 
 
Author: W Freedman 
THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE LOCAL SPHERE OF 
GOVERNMENT TO CONSERVE AND PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT: A 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF LE SUEUR v eTHEKWINI MUNICIPALITY 
[2013] ZAKZPHC 6 (30 January 2013) 
 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/pelj.v17i1.14 
2014 VOLUME 17 No 1 
ISSN 1727-3781 
 W FREEDMAN     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
 
 
567 
THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE LOCAL SPHERE OF GOVERNMENT 
TO CONSERVE AND PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
OF LE SUEUR v eTHEKWINI MUNICIPALITY [2013] ZAKZPHC 6 (30 
January 2013) 
 
W Freedman
* 
 
1  Introduction 
 
Legislative authority in South Africa is divided among the national, provincial and 
local spheres of government. Section 43 of the Constitution provides in this respect 
that  the  legislative  authority  of  the  national  sphere  of  government  is  vested  in 
Parliament;
1 that the legislative authority of the provincial sphere of government is 
vested in the provincial legislatures;
2 and that the legislative authority of the local 
sphere of government is vested in the municipal councils.
3 
 
The division of legislative authority among the different sph eres of government 
imposes  important  limits  on  each  legislature's  power  to  pass  legislation.  These 
"federalism limits" provide that a legislature (for example, Parliament or a specific 
provincial legislature or municipal council) may not pass legislation that falls outside 
its competence. An important consequence of these limits is that, if a legislature 
does adopt legislation that falls outside its competence, the legislation in question 
will be invalid.
4 
 
The allocation of legislative authority to municipal councils gives rise to a number of 
complex questions. One of these is the extent to which municipal councils are 
                                        
*   Warren Freedman. B Com (Wits), LLB (Wits), LLM (Natal). Associate Professor, School of Law, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus. Email: freedman@ukzn.ac.za. A shorter 
version  of  this  paper  was  presented  at  the  Environmental  Law  Association  2013  Annual 
Conference at the Salt Rock Hotel in Salt Rock on 27 July 2013. 
1   S 43(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). 
2   S 43(b) of the Constitution. 
3   S 43(c) of the Constitution. 
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entitled to pass legislation that deals with the conservation and protection of the 
"environment".  This  issue  was  considered  by  the  KwaZulu-Natal  High  Court: 
Pietermaritzburg in Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality.
5 
 
In  this  case  the  High  Court  found  that  even  though  the  functional  area  of 
"environment" has been explicitly allocated to the national and provincial spheres of 
government and not to the local sphere by the  Constitution, municipal councils are 
entitled to pass legislation that deals with the conservation and protection of the 
"environment", at least in those circumstances where it forms a part of "municipal 
planning".
6 
 
Before turning to discuss this case, however, it will be useful first to examine the 
manner in which the  Constitution  allocates legislative authority to the municipal 
councils. 
 
2  The local sphere of government 
 
The legislative powers of the municipal councils are set out in section 156 of the 
Constitution. 
 
Section 156(1) provides in this respect that a municipality has executive authority in 
respect of, and has the right to administer: 
 
(a)   the local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of 
Schedule 5; and 
(b)   any other matter assigned to it by national or provincial legislation. 
 
In addition, section 156(2) of the Constitution also provides that a municipality may 
make and administer by-laws for the effective administration of the matters which is 
has the right to administer. 
                                        
5   Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality 2013 ZAKZPHC 6. 
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Apart from sections 156(1) and (2), section 156(5) also provides that a municipality 
has the right to exercise any power concerning a matter reasonably necessary for, or 
incidental to, the effective performance of its functions. 
 
A careful examination of these sections shows that they distinguish between three 
types of powers: 
 
(a)   First,  those  powers  that  are  derived  directly  from  the  Constitution.  These 
powers may be referred to as "original powers".
7 
(b)   Second, those that are assigned to municipalities in terms of national or 
provincial  legislation.  These  powers  may  be  referred  to  as  "assigned 
powers".
8 
(c)   Third, those powers that are reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, the 
effective performance of a municipality's functions. These powers may be 
referred to as "incidental powers".
9 
 
3  Original municipal powers 
 
3.1  The nature of a municipal council's original powers 
 
As we have seen, sections 156(1) and 156(2) of the  Constitution provide that  a 
municipal council has the authority to pass laws in respect of the local government 
matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and in Part B of Schedule 5 of the Constitution. 
Given that these powers can be altered or withdrawn only if the Constitution itself is 
amended,  they  form  the  most  significant  source  of  municipal  powers  and  are  a 
fundamental feature of local government's institutional integrity.
10 
                                        
7   Ss 156(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. 
8   Ss 156(1)(b) and (2) of the Constitution. 
9   S 156(5) of the Constitution. 
10   The fact that original legislative powers have been conferred on municipal councils by the 
Constitution was confirmed by Moseneke J (as he then was) in his judgment in  City of Cape 
Town  v  Robertson   2005  2  SA  323  (CC)  where  he  held  that  "[a]  municipality  under  the 
Constitution is not a mere creature of statute otherwise moribund save if imbued with power by 
provincial or national legislation. A municipality enjoys 'original' and con stitutionally entrenched W FREEDMAN     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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Although  the  Constitution  confers  the  authority  on  municipalities  to  pass  laws  in 
respect of the matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5, the 
same  authority  has  also  been  conferred  upon  the  national  and  provincial 
governments. Municipalities, therefore, share the power to pass legislation on the 
matters listed in Schedules 4B and 5B with the national and provincial governments. 
 
While  municipalities  share  the  power  to  pass  legislation  on  the  matters  listed  in 
Schedules 4B and 5B with the national and provincial governments, it is important to 
note that they do not share the power to administer and implement these laws. This 
is because the power conferred upon the national and provincial governments to 
pass  laws  on  Schedule  4B  and  5B  matters  is  limited  by  sections  155(6)(a)  and 
155(7) of the Constitution. 
 
Section 155(6)(a) of the Constitution provides in this respect that 
 
…[e]ach provincial government ... by legislative and other measures, must provide 
for the monitoring and support of local government in the province… 
 
and section 155(7) that 
 
…[t]he national government, subject to section 44, and the provincial governments 
have the legislative and executive authority to see to the effective performance by 
municipalities of their functions in respect of matters listed in Schedule 4 and 5, by 
regulating the exercise by municipalities of their executive authority referred to in 
section 156(1). 
 
In Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal,
11 the 
Constitutional Court held that an important consequence of section 155(7) of the 
Constitution is that neither the national nor the provincial spheres of government 
                                                                                                                            
powers, functions, rights and duties that may be qualified or constrained by law and only to the 
extent  that  the  Constitution  permits"  (para  60).  For  a  detailed  discussion  of  a  municipality's 
original powers, see Steytler and De Visser Local Government Law 5-5, 5-11 to 5-12. 
11   Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC). W FREEDMAN     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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can,  by  legislation,  give  themselves  the  power  to  exercise  executive  municipal 
powers or the right to administer municipal affairs.
12 
 
This is because, the Constitutional Court held further, the mandate of these two 
spheres  is  ordinarily  limited  to  "regulating"  the  exercise  of  executive  municipal 
powers,  and  the  administration  of  municipal  affairs  by  municipalities  and  the 
authority  to  "regulate"  does  not  include  the  power  to  exercise  municipal 
competencies and perform municipal functions. Instead, it simply includes the power 
to establish a framework within which a municipality must perform.
13 
 
In other words, while the national and provincial spheres of government are entitled 
to pass laws regulating the local government matters set out in Schedule 4B and 
Schedule 5B, they are not entitled to legislate  on the "core" of Schedule 4B and 
Schedule 5B matters. Instead, they are entitled to pass only framework legislation 
dealing with national standards, minimum requirements, monitoring procedures and 
so on. 
 
In addition, while the national and provincial spheres of government are entitled to 
pass laws regulating the local government matters set out in Schedule 4B and 
Schedule 5B, they are not entitled to give themselves the power to administer or 
implement those laws. The power to administer or implement those  laws must be 
exercised by municipalities themselves. 
 
3.2  The scope and ambit of a municipal council's original powers 
 
The scope and ambit of the functional areas set out in Schedule 4 and Schedule 5 
have been considered by the Constitutional Court on a number of occasions.
14 One 
                                        
12   Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC) 
para 59. 
13   Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal  2010 6 SA 182 (CC) 
para 59. 
14   See Ex parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill  2000 1 SA 732 (CC); 
Warey Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd  2009 1 SA 337 (CC);  Johannesburg Metropolitan W FREEDMAN     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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of the most important of these judgments is Ex parte President of the RSA: In re 
Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill.
15 
 
In this case the Constitutional Court held that that the scope and ambit of the 
matters set out in Schedule 4 and Schedule 5 of the Constitution must be interpreted 
in the light of the model of government adopted by the Constitution and the manner 
in which the Constitution allocates power to the different spheres of government. 
 
In  relation  to  the  model  of  govern ment  adopted  by  the  Constitution,  the 
Constitutional Court has also held that the Constitution: 
 
(a)   distributes authority amongst the national, provincial and local spheres of 
government; 
(b)   provides that each sphere has the autonomy to exercise its po wers and 
perform its functions within the parameters of its defined space; 
(c)   imposes a duty on each sphere not to assume any power or function except 
those conferred on it in terms of the Constitution; and 
(d)   confers  extensive  powers  on  parliament  inc luding  the  power  to  pass 
legislation on "any matter", excluding only those matters that fall within the 
functional areas of exclusive provincial competence set out in Schedule 5.
16 
 
Two important consequences flow from this model: 
 
First, although they may appear to overlap, the functional areas of concurrent 
national and provincial competence listed in Schedule 4 must be interpreted as being 
distinct from and excluding the functional areas of exclusive provincial competence 
                                                                                                                            
Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC); Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of 
Cape Town 2012 4 SA 181 (CC); Minister for Mineral Resources v Swartland Municipality 2012 7 
BCLR  712  (CC);  and  Minister  of  Local  Government,  Environmental  Affairs  and  Development 
Planning v Lagoon Bay Lifestyle (Pty) Ltd 2013 ZACC 39. 
15   Ex parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 732 (CC). 
16   See Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of 
the  RSA  1996   1996  4  SA  744  (CC)  para  364;  Ex  parte  President  of  the  RSA:  In  re 
Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 732 (CC) para 42; and  Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC) para 43. W FREEDMAN     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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set out in Schedule 5.
17 This is because even though section 44(2) confers the power 
on Parliament to intervene and pass legislation on a matter set out in Schedule 5, 
the requirements of section 44(2) are very strict and Parliament will be able to do so 
on very rare occasions only. If the functional areas listed in Schedule 4 and 5 
overlapped, therefore, Parliament would be able to pass legislation that affected a 
Schedule 5 matter without first having to satisfy the requirements of section 44(2).
18 
 
Second, the functional areas of exclusive provincial competence listed in Schedule 5 
relate  only  to  those  matters  which  may  appropriately  be  regulated  within  the 
boundaries of a province (intra-provincially) and not to those matters which should 
be  regulated  across  the  b oundaries  of  a  province  (inter -provincially).
19  This  is 
because the grounds on which parliament is entitled to intervene in Schedule 5 
matters in terms of section 44(2) of the  Constitution  and the grounds on which 
national legislation may override provincial legislation in terms of section 146(2) of 
the Constitution clearly show that Parliament has the authority to regulate those 
activities that take place across provincial boundaries. If the functional areas listed in 
Schedule 5 include activities that take place across provincial boundaries. Therefore, 
Parliament would not be able to regulate them unless it intervened in terms of 
section 44(2) which, as we have seen, is difficult for Parliament to do.
20 
 
The principle that a province's exclusive powers relat e only to those matters which 
may appropriately be regulated within the boundaries of a province was extended to 
municipalities by the Western Cape High Court: Cape Town in The Habitat Council v 
Provincial Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affair s and Development 
Planning Western Cape.
21 
                                        
17   Ex parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 732 (CC) para 
51. 
18   Ex parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 732 (CC) paras 
49-50. 
19   Ex parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill  2000 1 SA 732 (CC) para 
53. 
20   Ex parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill  2000 1 SA 732 (CC) para 
52. 
21   Habitat Council v Provincial Minister of Local Governme nt etc, Western Cape  2013 6 SA 113 
(WCC). W FREEDMAN     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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In this case the High Court held that a municipality's exclusive powers should be 
interpreted as applying primarily to matters which may appropriately be regulated 
intra-municipally, as opposed to intra-provincially. This means that where a matter 
requires regulation inter-municipally, rather than intra-municipally, the national and 
provincial governments have been given the power to do so, either concurrently or 
exclusively. 
 
In arriving at this conclusion, the High Court relied heavily on the judgment in the 
Liquor  Bill  case  even  though  that  case  dealt  with  the  distribution  of  legislative 
powers between the national and provincial spheres of government, rather than the 
distribution  of  executive  powers  between  the  provincial  and  local  spheres  of 
government. 
 
The second principle to which I wish to draw attention concerns the municipality's 
exclusive powers, which should be interpreted as applying primarily to matters which 
may appropriately be regulated intra-municipally, as opposed to intra-provincially. 
 
In Ex Parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 
732 (CC), Cameron, AJ (as he then was) said the following in this connection: 
 
The Constitution-makers' allocation of powers to the national and provincial spheres 
appears to have proceeded from a functional vision of what was appropriate to 
each sphere and, accordingly, the competences itemised in Schedules 4 and 5 are 
referred to as being in respect of 'functional areas'. The ambit of the provinces' 
exclusive powers must, in my view, be determined in the light of that vision. It is 
significant that s 104(1)(b) confers power on each province to pass legislation 'for 
its  province'  within  a  'functional  area'.  It  is  thus  clear  from  the  outset  that the 
Schedule 5 competences must be interpreted as conferring power on each province 
to legislate in the exclusive domain only 'for its province'. From the powers of s 
44(2) it is evident that the national government is entrusted with overriding powers 
where  necessary  to  maintain  national  security,  economic  unity  and  essential 
national standards; to establish minimum standards required for the rendering of 
services; and to prevent unreasonable action by provinces which is prejudicial to W FREEDMAN     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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the interests of another province or the country as a whole. From s 146 it is evident 
that national legislation within the concurrent  terrain of Schedule 4 that applies 
uniformly  to  the  country  takes  precedence  over  the  provincial  powers  and 
circumstances contemplated in s 44(2)...
22 
 
From  this  dictum  it  is  evident  that,  where  a  matter  requires  regulation  inter-
provincially as opposed to intra-provincially, the Constitution ensures that national 
government  is  accorded  the  necessary  power,  either  exclusively  or  concurrently 
under Schedule 4 or through the powers of intervention accorded to it by section 
44(2). It appears that this principle must likewise apply to the proposition that has 
been  outlined  with  regard  to  intra-municipal,  as  opposed  to  inter-municipal 
regulation.
23 
 
Apart from the principles set out in the Liquor Bill case, the Constitutional Court has 
also held that where two or more matters in the same Schedule appear to overlap 
with each other they should be interpreted in a "bottom-up" manner.
24 A bottom-up 
method of interpretation is one in which the more specific matter is defined first and 
all residual areas are left for the much broader matter.
25 
 
When it comes to determining where apparently overlapping functional areas of 
respective spheres commence and end, therefore, a court must determine, first, 
what  powers  are  vested  in  municipalities;  second,  what  powers  are  vested  in 
provincial  governments;  and  third,  what  powers  are  vested  in  the  national 
government.
26 
 
                                        
22   Ex Parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 732 (CC) para 
51. 
23   Habitat Council v Provincial Minister of Local Government etc, Western Cape  2013 6 SA 113 
(WCC) 120C-G. 
24   See Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal  2010 6 SA 182 
(CC) paras 60-63. 
25   See Steytler and De Visser Local Government Law 5-21 to 5-22. 
26   See Habitat Council v Provincial Minister of Local Government etc, Western Cape  2013 6 SA 113 
(WCC) 120H-I. W FREEDMAN     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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In the Gauteng Development Tribunal case, for example, one of the key questions 
the  Constitutional  Court  had  to  answer  was  whether  the  power  to  approve 
applications for the rezoning of land and establishment of townships fell into the 
broad matter of "urban and rural development", which is listed in Schedule 4A, or 
into the specific matter of "municipal planning", which is listed in Schedule 4B. In 
accordance with the bottom-up method of interpretation, the Constitutional Court 
began its analysis, not with an examination of the scope and ambit of the broad 
matter of "urban and rural development", but rather with  an examination of  the 
scope and ambit of the specific matter of "municipal planning". 
 
Insofar  as  the  scope  and  ambit  of  "municipal  planning"  was  concerned,  the 
Constitutional Court began by explaining that although the term is not defined in the 
Constitution it has a particular and well-known meaning, which includes the zoning 
of land and the establishment of townships.
27 
 
In addition, the Constitutional Court explained further that there is nothing in the 
Constitution which indicated that the term "municipal planning" should be given a 
meaning which is different from its common meaning.
28  The power to approve 
applications for the rezoning of land and the establishment of a township did, 
therefore, fall into the area of "municipal planning" listed in Schedule 4B.
29 
 
After coming to this conclusion, the Constitutional Court turned to consider whether 
the same powers also fell into the broad matter of "urban and rural development". 
The Court held that they did not. In arriving at this conclusion, the Constitutional 
Court began by explaining that the term "urban and rural development" could not be 
interpreted in a way that included the power to approve applications for the rezoning 
of land and the establishment of townships. This is because, the Constitutional Court 
                                        
27   Johanesburg  Metropolitan  Municipality  v  Gauteng  Development  Tribunal  2010  6  SA  182  (CC) 
para 57. 
28   Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal  2010 6 SA 182 (CC) 
para 57. 
29   Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal  2010 6 SA 182 (CC) 
para 57. W FREEDMAN     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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explained further, such an interpretation would infringe the principles of co-operative 
governance  which  provide  that  each  sphere  of  government  must  respect  the 
functions of the other spheres and must not assume any functions or powers not 
conferred upon them by the Constitution or encroach on the functional integrity of 
the other spheres.
30 
  
An important consequence of this approach, the Court went on to hold, was that the 
term "urban and rural development" should be interpreted narrowly so that each 
sphere of government could exercise its powers without interference by another 
sphere of government.
31 
 
Having found that the term "urban and rural development" was not broad enough to 
include the powers that form a part of "municipal planning", the Constitutional Court 
then concluded, it was not necessary to go any further and define exactly what the 
scope of the functional area of "urban and rural development" was.
32 
 
                                        
30   Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC) 
paras 58, 61. 
31   Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal  2010 6 SA 182 (CC) 
para 62. 
32   Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal  2010 6 SA 182 (CC) 
para 63. In Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 2 SA 
554 (SCA) para 35 the Supreme Court of Appeal described the "bottom-up" approach as follows: 
"The construction that was adopted by the court below ... and that was advanced before us by 
counsel for the respondents, all proceed by inferential rea soning from the proposition that the 
functions with which we are now concerned are embraced by the concept of 'development' (a 
functional area that falls within the concurrent legislative authority of national and provincial 
government) and thus, by infere nce, fall to be excluded from the functional area 'municipal 
planning'. That line of reasoning seems to me to approach the matter the wrong way around. It 
is to be expected that the powers that are vested in government at national level will be 
described in the broadest of terms, that the powers that are vested in provincial government will 
be expressed in narrower terms, and that the powers that are vested in municipalities will be 
expressed in the narrowest terms of all. To reason inferentially with the b roader expression as a 
starting point is bound to denude the narrower expression of any meaning and by so doing to 
invert the clear constitutional intention of devolving powers on local government". W FREEDMAN     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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In  the  same  case,  the  Constitutional  Court  also  held  that  not  only  must  the 
functional  areas  listed  in  Schedule  4  be  interpreted  as  being  distinct  from  the 
functional areas listed in Schedule 5, but the functional areas within each Schedule 
must  also  be  interpreted  as  being  distinct  from  one  another.  "Urban  and  rural 
development",  therefore,  must  be  given  a  different  content  from  "municipal 
planning". In this respect, the Constitutional Court stated that: 
 
It is, however, true that the functional areas allocated to the various spheres of 
government  are  not  contained  in  hermetically  sealed  compartments.  But  that 
notwithstanding, they remain distinct from one another. This is the position, even in 
respect of functional areas that share the same wording, like roads, planning, sport 
and  others.  The  distinctiveness  lies  in  the  level  at  which  a  particular  power  is 
exercised. For example, the provinces exercise powers relating to 'provincial roads', 
whereas municipalities have authority over 'municipal roads'. The prefix attached to 
each functional area identifies the sphere to which it belongs and distinguishes it 
from the functional areas allocated to the other spheres. In the example just given, 
the functional area of 'provincial roads' does not include 'municipal roads'. In the 
same vein, 'provincial planning' and 'regional planning and development' do not 
include 'municipal planning'. The constitutional scheme propels one ineluctably to 
the  conclusion  that,  barring  functional  areas  of  concurrent  competence,  each 
sphere of government is allocated separate and distinct powers which it alone is 
entitled to exercise.
33 
 
4  Assigned municipal powers 
 
Sections 156(1) and (2) of the Constitution provide that municipal councils have the 
authority to pass laws with respect to the matters assigned to them by national or 
provincial  legislation.
34  These  sections  must  be  read  together  with  section 
44(1)(a)(iii) of the  Constitution, which provides that the National Assembly may 
assign any of its legislative powers, except the power to amend the  Constitution, to 
                                        
33   Johanesburg  Metropolitan  Municipality  v  Gauteng  Development  Tribunal  2010  6  SA  182  (CC) 
para 55. 
34   For a detailed discussion of a municipality's assigned powers , see Steytler and De Visser  Local 
Government Law 5-42 to 5-50. W FREEDMAN     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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any legislative body in another sphere of government. In addition, they must also be 
read  together  with  section  104(1)(c)  of  the  Constitution,  which  provides  that  a 
provincial legislature may assign any of its legislative powers to a municipal council 
in that province. 
 
The  National  Assembly's  authority  to  assign  any  of  its  legislative  powers  to  the 
provincial sphere of government was considered by the Constitutional Court in its 
judgment  in  Premier,  Limpopo  Province  v  Speaker  of  the  Limpopo  Provincial 
Government.
35 One of the issues the Constitutional Court had to decide in this case 
was whether the National Assembly could assign a matter that falls outside of 
Schedules  4  and  5  to  the  provinces  impliedly  rather  than  expressly.  The 
Constitutional Court held that it could no t; instead, it had to assign these matters 
expressly. 
 
The Constitutional Court based its decision on the following grounds: 
 
First, that section 104(1)(b)(iii) of the Constitution states that a provincial legislature 
has the authority to pass legislation on any matter outside Schedule 4 and 5 that has 
been "expressly" assigned to it by national legislation.
36 
 
Second, that the word "expressly" should not be interpreted broadly to include the 
word "impliedly". This is because the constitutional scheme shows that the legislative 
authority of the provinces must be clearly identifiable and that the word "expressly" 
must be given a meaning that is consistent with this scheme.
37 
 
Third, that the principle of the rule of law provides that when Parliament assigns 
powers to the provinces it must do so in a manner that creates certainty about the 
                                        
35   Premier, Limpopo Province v  Speaker  of the  Limpopo Provincial Government  2011 6 SA 396 
(CC). 
36   Premier, Limpopo Province v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Government 2011 6 SA 396 (CC) 
para 34. 
37   Premier, Limpopo Province v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Government 2011 6 SA 396 (CC) 
para 35. W FREEDMAN     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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nature  and  extent  of  the  powers  assigned.  This  means  that  the  assignment  of 
legislative powers must leave no doubt about the act of assignment and the nature 
and scope of the powers assigned.
38 
 
Fourth, that this approach is consistent with Chapter Three of the  Constitution, 
which provides that 
 
...all spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must not 
assume any power or function except those conferred on  them in terms of the 
Constitution. 
 
The  public  should  be  left  with  no  doubt  about  which  sphere  of  government  has 
legislative  competence  with  regard  to  the  matter  concerned.  This  is  to  preclude 
disputes.
39 
 
Apart from the grounds set out above, the Constitutional Court also pointed out that 
the use of the qualifier "expressly" in section 104(1)(b)(iii) stands in stark contrast to 
the absence of such a qualifier in section 156(1), where the  Constitution refers to 
matters over which municipalities have executive and administrative and, therefore, 
legislative authority. 
 
The  Constitution  makes  a  deliberate  choice  in  the  formulation  of  section 
104(1)(b)(iii). Instead of merely requiring that powers be 'assigned', it qualifies the 
assignment by specifying that it must be 'expressly' made. The deliberate use of the 
qualifier 'expressly' in section 104(1)(b)(iii), stands in stark contrast to the absence 
of such qualifier, in section 156(1), where the  Constitution refers to matters over 
which municipalities have executive and administrative authority. Section 156(1)(a) 
provides that municipalities have executive authority in respect of, and the right to 
administer, 'the local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of 
                                        
38   Premier, Limpopo Province v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Government 2011 6 SA 396 (CC) 
para 36. 
39   Premier, Limpopo Province v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Government 2011 6 SA 396 (CC) 
para 37. W FREEDMAN     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
 
 
581 
Schedule  5'.  Section  156(1)(b)  further  confers  an  executive  authority  on 
municipalities  to  administer  'any  other  matter  assigned  to  [them]  by  national  or 
provincial legislation'.
40 
 
The implication is that while the power to pass legislation on a matter that falls 
outside Schedules 4 and   5 cannot be assigned by implication to the provincial 
legislatures, it can be assigned by implication to the municipal councils. 
 
Finally,  it  is  important  to  note  that  when  a  matter  has  been  assigned  to  a 
municipality by national or provincial legislation, the matter will usually become an 
exclusive municipal competence, at least until the national or provincial legislation is 
repealed. This is because, unlike the concept of a delegation, the concept of an 
"assignment" encompasses the full transfer of the  authority to exercise power over 
the matter in question. In  Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v President 
of the RSA ,
41  for example, Kriegler J  stated that it is important to  distinguish 
between  the  concept  of  an  assignment  and  the  concept  of  a  de legation.  A 
delegation, he stated further, postulates a less complete transfer of authority than 
an assignment does.
42 
 
5  Incidental municipal powers 
 
Section  156(5)  of  the  Constitution  provides  that  a  municipality  has  the  right  to 
exercise  any  power  concerning  a  matter  that  is  reasonably  necessary  for,  or 
incidental to, the effective performance of its functions. This power is sometimes 
referred  to  as  the  "incidental  power".  "Incidental  power"  refers  to  those  matters 
which, strictly speaking, fall outside the functional areas over which a municipality 
has  authority,  but  are  so  closely  connected  to  the  "effective  performance  of  its 
functions" that they are considered to be a part of the functional areas over which a 
                                        
40   Premier, Limpopo Province v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Government 2011 6 SA 396 (CC) 
para 40. 
41   Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v President of the RSA 1995 4 SA 887 (CC). 
42   Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v President of the RSA  1995 4 SA 887 (CC) para 
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municipality has authority. As Steytler and De Visser point out, what this means is 
that while section 156(5) does not confer new functional areas on a municipality, it 
does confer on a municipality the power to adopt measures that will enhance the 
effective  administration  of  its  existing  functional  areas.  This  could,  for  example, 
include the power to create offences and impose penalties for transgressing a by-
law, or, perhaps, the power to impose an environmental authorisation procedure.
43 
 
The incidental power was applied in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg.
44 The facts of 
this case were as follows:  prior to 2004 the residents of Phiri in Soweto were 
charged a flat rate of R68,40 per month for using water supplied to them by the 
City. This amount was based on a deemed monthly consumption of 20 kilolitres of 
water per household. The actual monthly consumption per household, however, was 
much higher, although it was not possible to tell how much of the excess was 
consumed by residents or lost through leakage. Despite the fact that they were 
charged only R68,40 per month, most of the residents of Phiri did not actually pay 
this amount. 
 
In order to reduce the amount of water lost through leakage and to increase the 
rate of payment, the City decided to abandon the system of deemed consumption 
flat rate charges and replace it with a free basic supply of six kilolitres per household 
per month and a pre-paid meter system. The applicants, who were residents of Phiri, 
then applied for an orde r declaring the City's decision to be unconstitutional and 
invalid. They based their application on a number of grounds. One of these was that 
the decision to install pre-paid meters was not authorised by the law. 
 
In  response  the  City  argued  that  the  inst allation  of  the  pre -paid  meters  was 
authorised by section 3 of the City's Water Services By -laws, which provided for 
three different levels of water service, namely Service Level 1, Service Level 2 and 
                                        
43   For a more detailed discussion of a municipality's incidental powers see Steytler and De Visser 
Local Government Law 5-6 to 5-8. 
44   Mazibuko  v  City  of  Johannesburg   2010  4  SA  1  (CC).  See  also  Western  Cape  Provincial 
Government: In re DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West Provincial Government  2001 1 SA 500 
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Service Level 3, which was the level of service provided to the residents of Phiri. 
Insofar as this level was concerned, section 3(2)(c) of the By-law expressly stated 
that it had to consist of: (a) a metered full pressure water connection to each stand; 
and (b) a conventional water borne drainage installation connected to the Council's 
sewer. 
 
Although section 3(2)(c) of the By-law did not expressly refer to pre-paid meters, 
the City argued further, the phrase "a metered full pressure water connection" had 
to be interpreted to include both credit meters and prepaid meters, and that the 
installation  of  pre-paid  meters  was  therefore  authorised  by  the  By-law.  The 
Constitutional  Court  accepted  the  City's  argument.  In  addition,  it  also  held  that 
section 95(i) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act ("Municipal Systems 
Act"),
45 which expressly requires local government to provide accessible pay points 
for  settling  accounts  or  for  making  pre -payments  for  services,
46  conferred  the 
authority on the City to install pre-paid meters. 
 
Apart from these two arguments,  however, the Constitutional Court also held that 
the power to install pre -paid meters was reasonably incidental to the effective 
performance of the functions of a municipality. This was because, the Court held 
further,  the  power  to  install  pre -paid  meters  was  one  which  was  reasonably 
incidental to providing services to citizens in a sustainable manner that permitted 
cost  recovery.  Given that  the  power  to  install  pre -paid  meters  was  reasonably 
incidental to the effect performance of its functions, the Court  held further, section 
3(2)(c) of the By-laws should be interpreted in a manner that conferred this power 
on the City.
47 
 
Although the issue in this case was not whether the municipal council had the power 
to pass a law dealing with pre-paid meters, but rather whether the municipal council 
had in fact passed such a law, the judgment can be interpreted as saying that while 
                                        
45   Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
46   S 95(i) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
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the subject-matter of pre-paid water meters does not fall into any of the functional 
areas set out in Part B of Schedule 4 and 5, and especially not into the functional 
area of "water and sanitation services" listed in Part B of Schedule 4, a municipal 
council can still pass a law on pre-paid water meters because they are so closely 
connected to "water and sanitation services" that they are considered to be a part of 
that functional area. 
 
6  Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality 
 
6.1  The facts 
 
The facts of this case were as follows. In 2010, the eThekwini Municipal Council 
adopted a resolution amending its town planning scheme to introduce the Durban 
Open Space System ("D-MOSS"). This system is aimed at protecting areas that have 
a high biodiversity value in Durban by creating a system of open spaces that are 
interconnected. In order to achieve this goal, the system provides that land which 
falls  within  a  D-MOSS  area  may  not  be  developed  without  first  obtaining  an 
environmental authorization in terms of the municipality's town planning schemes, 
and even then it may be developed only subject to strict controls aimed at protecting 
the ecological goods and services the land provides. 
 
After the municipal council adopted this resolution, the applicant, who owned land 
located  in  the  eThekwini  Municipality  and  whose  land  fell  into  a  D-MOSS  area, 
applied for an order declaring the resolution to be unconstitutional and invalid. He 
based  his  application,  inter  alia,  on  the  grounds  that  the  subject  matter  of  the 
resolution was the "protection of the environment"; that the "environment" is listed 
in Schedule 4A of the Constitution as a functional area of national and provincial 
legislative  competence;  and,  consequently,  that  the  resolution  fell  outside  the 
legislative authority of the municipal council and was therefore unconstitutional and 
invalid. 
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6.2  The judgment 
 
The High Court (per Gyanda J) rejected the applicant's argument. In arriving at this 
decision, the High Court began by observing that the functional area of "municipal 
planning", which is set out in Schedule 4B, must be interpreted in the light of section 
24  of  the  Constitution,  which  provides  that  "[e]veryone  has  a  right  to  an 
environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being", and section 152(1)(d), 
which provides that one of the objectives of local government is to "promote a safe 
and healthy environment". These sections clearly indicate that the functional area of 
"municipal planning" includes responsibility over environmental affairs.
48 
 
In addition, the High Court observed, the functional area of the "environment" is not 
contained in a hermetically sealed compartment. Instead, it is an area over which all 
three  spheres  of  government  enjoy  overlapping  authority.  This  is  because 
municipalities are in the best position to know, understand and deal with issues 
involving the environment at a local level, and  also because municipalities have 
historically always exercised legislative responsibility over environmental affairs as a 
part of municipal planning. Given that authority over the functional area of the 
"environment" had to reside in all three spheres, it could not be inserted in Part B of 
Schedules 4 and 5. Instead, it had to be inserted in Part A of Schedule 4.
49 
 
Apart  from  finding  that  "municipal  planning"  includes  responsibility  over 
environmental affairs, the High Court also held that it is clear that  legislative and 
executive authority over environmental matters as a part of municipal planning has 
been assigned to municipalities by national and provincial legislation. In this respect 
the High Court started by pointing out that section 23(1)(c) of the Municipal Systems 
Act,  which  deals  with  integrated  development  planning  at  a  municipal  level, 
recognises that there is an obligation on municipalities together with other organs of 
state to contribute to the progressive realisation of the fundamental rights contained 
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in section 24 of the Constitution, and that this was clearly a legislative mandate from 
the national legislature with regard to environmental matters.
50 
 
In addition, the High Court pointed out further, sections 25 and 26 of the  Municipal 
Systems  Act  provide that not only must every municipality adopt an integrated 
development  plan  ("IDP"),
51  but  also  that  every  IDP  must  include  a  spatial 
development  framework
52  and  -  in  terms  of  the  regulations  issued  under  the 
Municipal Systems Act
53 - that every spatial development framework must "contain a 
strategic  assessment  of  the  environmental  impact  of  the  spatial  development 
framework".
54 
 
Besides the Municipal Systems Act, the High Court went on to point out, section 2 of 
the National Environmental Management Act ("NEMA")
55 contains a set of national 
environmental management principles that apply to the actions of all organs of 
state, including municipalities, that may significantly affect the environment,
56 and 
section 33 of the same Act allows a person to institute a private prosecution in those 
cases in which the accused has infringed a municipal by -law and the by -law is 
"concerned  with  the protection  of  the  environment".  Section  33  of  NEMA  thus 
envisages the enactment of municipal by -laws that deal with the  protection of the 
environment.
57 
 
In addition, section 48 of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act
58 
provides,  inter alia, that municipalities must not only align their IDPs with the 
national biodiversity framework and any applicable bioregional plan,
59 but must also 
incorporate the provisions of the national biodiversity framework or bioregional plan 
                                        
50   Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality 2013 ZAKZPHC 6 para 24. 
51   See s 25(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
52   See s 26(e) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
53   Reg  2(4)(f)  of  the  Local  Government:  Municipal  Planning  and  Performance  Management 
Regulations published in GN R796 in GG 22605 of 24 August 2001. 
54   Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality 2013 ZAKZPHC 6 para 26. 
55   National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. 
56   Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality 2013 ZAKZPHC 6 para 34. 
57   Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality 2013 ZAKZPHC 6 para 36. 
58   National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004. 
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that specifically apply to them in their IDPs,
60 and demonstrate in the IDP how the 
national  biodiversity  framework  and  any  applicable  bioregion al  plan  may  be 
implemented in their areas of jurisdiction.
61 
 
After setting out these principles, the High Court turned to apply them to the facts. 
In this respect it found that municipalities are authorised to legislate in respect of 
environmental  matters  to  protect  the  environment  at  the  local  level  and, 
consequently, that the resolution amending the town planning scheme to introduce 
the  D-MOSS  did  not  fall  outside  the  legislative  competence  of  the  eThekwini 
Municipality: 
 
It is clear from the foregoing an d the arguments advanced by the first respondent 
that contrary to the submissions by and on behalf of the applicants, municipalities 
have traditionally been involved in regulating environmental matters at the local 
level and that their functions at this le vel have been recognised by the drafters of 
the Constitution. Hence, although environmental matters stood as the apparently 
exclusive area for national and provincial governance at those levels, it is clear that 
the  authority  of  the  municipalities  at  local   government  level  to  manage  the 
environment at that level has always been and is still recognised. It is inconceivable 
that  the  drafters  of  the  Constitution  intended  by  the  manner  in  which  the 
Constitution  was  framed  to  exclude  municipalities  altogether  fr om  legislating  in 
respect of environmental matters at the local level. In any event, it is clear that 
national and provincial legislation in respect of environmental issues recognises the 
part to be played by municipalities at the local government level in  managing and 
controlling the environment.
62 
 
Accordingly, I am satisfied that Municipalities are in fact authorised to legislate in 
respect of environmental matters to protect the environment at the local level and 
that the D-MOSS Amendments in no way tran sgress or intrude upon the exclusive 
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purview  of  the  national  and  provincial  governance  in  respect  of  environmental 
legislation. I am, therefore, satisfied that the D-MOSS Amendments introduced by 
the first respondent are not unconstitutional and invalid on the basis contended for 
by the applicants, namely, that the first respondent did not have the authority to 
legislate in this regard.
63 
 
7  Critical comment 
 
Out of the three categories of legislative powers that municipal councils may enjoy, 
the High Court based its decision on the first two, namely the original legislative 
powers and the assigned legislative powers. For this reason, it is not necessary to 
say anything more about the third category of legislative power.
64 
 
Insofar as the first and second cate gories are concerned, the High Court relied 
primarily on the first category when it held that the functional area of "municipal 
planning" encompasses "environmental matters", and only as an alternative on the 
second  ground,  when  it  held  that  legislative  an d  executive  authority  over 
environmental matters as a part of municipal planning has been assigned by national 
and provincial legislation to municipalities. 
 
Given that the  Constitution  allows Parliament to assign matters to the municipal 
councils  much  mor e  easily  than  it  allows  Parliament  to  assign  matters  to  the 
provincial legislatures, the judgment appears to be correct in holding that national 
and  provincial  legislation  has  implicitly  assigned  legislative  authority  over 
environment matters as a part of municipal planning to municipalities. 
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64   Given that the purpose of the incidental power is not to confer new  functional areas on 
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When it comes to the first category, however, it is not clear whether the functional 
area of "municipal planning" can simply be interpreted to encompass "environmental 
matters at the local level" or at least not "environmental matters at the local level" in 
the broad sense the use of this phrase by the High Court suggests. In this respect 
the following points can be made: 
 
First, that including "environmental matters at the local level" in the functional area 
of "municipal planning" potentially upsets the division of subject-matters envisaged 
by the drafters of the Constitution. An examination of Schedules 4 and 5 indicates 
that while the drafters allocated certain environmental matters to the local sphere of 
government, such as air pollution, domestic waste water disposal, noise pollution 
and refuse removal, they reserved all other environmental matters, for example the 
protection  of  biodiversity,  for  the  national  and  provincial  spheres.
65  Given these 
points, it may be argued that the protection of biodiversity falls outside the original 
legislative competence of the local sphere of government. 
 
Second, that including "environmental matters at the local level" in the functional 
area  of  "municipal  planning"  means  that  there  will  be  an  overlap  between  the 
functional area of "municipal planning" in Part B of Schedule 4 and the functional 
area of "environment" in Part A of Schedule B. In the Gauteng Development Tribunal 
case,  however,  the  Constitutional  Court  held  that  even  though  they  are  not 
contained in hermetically sealed containers, the functional areas are distinct from 
one another and one functional area should not include another. 
 
Insofar as this point is concerned, it should also be noted that while there may be an 
overlap between the functional area of "environment" and the functional area of 
"municipal planning", this does not give a municipal council the power to legislate in 
                                        
65   The environmental matters explicitly allocated to the local sphere of government in Schedules 4B 
and 5B of the Constitution include the following: air pollution; storm water management systems 
in  built-up  areas;  water  and  sanitation  services  limited  to  potable  water  supply  systems  and 
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the overlap. In other words, this does not give a municipal council the power to pass 
legislation  that  deals  predominantly  with  the  "environment"  rather  than  with 
"municipal  planning".  In  the  case  at  hand  it  is  difficult  to  know  whether  the 
Resolution  introducing  the  D-MOSS  system  deals  predominantly  with  the 
"environment" or with "municipal planning". As pointed out above, this is because 
the High Court did not clearly identify the subject-matter of the Resolution. 
 
Third, that including "environmental matters at the local level" in the functional area 
of  "municipal  planning"  could  have  unintended  practical  consequences.  This  is 
because in the  Gauteng Development Tribunal case the Constitutional Court also 
held that while the national  and provincial governments have the power to pass 
legislation with respect to the matters listed in Part B of Schedules 4 and 5, they do 
not have the power to implement that legislation. The power to implement national 
and provincial legislation dealing with the matters listed in Part B of Schedules 4 and 
5 vests exclusively in local government. 
 
While  the  functional  area  of  "municipal  planning"  cannot  simply  encompass  the 
broad subject-matter of "environment matters at the local level" for the reasons set 
out above, this does not mean that the functional area of "municipal planning" does 
not include certain specific environmental matters at the local level. Unfortunately, it 
is difficult to know which sorts of specific environmental matters at the local level 
should be included in the functional area of "municipal planning". This is because the 
High Court found that the substance of the resolution amending the town planning 
scheme  to  introduce  the  D-MOSS  was  simply  the  "environment",  without  first 
examining the resolution in the light of the factors that have been identified by the 
Constitutional Court on several occasions.
66  
 
                                        
66   See Ex parte Speaker of the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature: In re KwaZulu Amakhosi and 
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In the DVB Behuising case, for example, the Constitutional Court held that when it 
comes to determining whether or not legislation falls into a particular legislature's 
field  of  competence,  a  court  first  has  to  determine  "the  subject-matter  or  the 
substance of the legislation, its essence, or true purpose and effect, that is what the 
[legislation] is about". In other words, the court has to look beyond the legislation's 
character or form and identify its true purpose and effect.
67 
 
The reason a court must look beyond the legislation's character or form and identify 
its true purpose and effect, the Constitutional Court held further, is because the 
purpose and effect may show that although the legislation purports to deal with a 
matter that falls within a legislature's field of co mpetence, its true purpose and 
effect may be to achieve a different goal, one which falls outside the legislatures 
field of competence.
68 
 
In addition, the Constitutional Court also held that, when a court seeks to determine 
the subject-matter or substance  of the legislation in question, it should take the 
preamble to the legislation and its legislative history into account. This is because 
they serve to illuminate the legislation's substance. "They place [the legislation] in 
context, provide an explanation  for its provisions and articulate the policy behind 
them."
69 
 
In the same judgment, the Constitutional Court went on to warn that it may not be 
possible to subject a particular piece of legislation to a uniform analysis directed at 
yielding a single charact erisation of what its purpose might be. A single statute 
might have more than one purpose. Different parts of that statute may thus require 
different assessments in regard to the disputed question of legislative competence.
70 
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If the High Court had followed the procedure set out above more closely, we would 
undoubtedly have a much better sense of whether or not the specific environmental 
matters  dealt  with  by  the  D-MOSS  Amendments  fell  into  the  functional  area  of 
"municipal  planning"  and,  consequently,  of  the  sorts  of  specific  environmental 
matters at the local level that may or may not be included in "municipal planning". 
 
8  Conclusion 
 
While the judgment in Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality has correctly confirmed 
that municipal councils have the original authority to pass legislation dealing with 
environmental  matters  as  a  part  of  their  power  to  pass  legislation  dealing  with 
municipal planning, it has not set out the scope and ambit of this power as clearly as 
it  could  have.  Given,  however,  that  similar  schemes  will  in  all  likelihood  be 
implemented in other municipalities in the future, it seems inevitable that the issues 
raised in Le Sueur will be the subject of further litigation. This will contribute to the 
development of our nascent jurisprudence in this complex area of the law. W FREEDMAN     PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
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